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Response to Bruce Maxwell
Kristja´n Kristja´nsson
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
Bruce Maxwell’s review of my book Justice and Desert-Based Emotions (hereafter: JDBE)
is a philosophical essay—and one independently valuable as such—in the guise of a review
paper. At almost 12,000 words, it amounts to approximately 15% of the total length of the
book that it reviews, which is unusual to say the least. Maxwell brings to his discussion
myriad sources from the current literature other than my book; and in addition to offering a
critical commentary on almost every section of it, he gives us his own take on most of the
key issues.
I am, needless to say, pleased with the generally approving and encouraging tone of
Maxwell’s critique. Particularly heart-warming is his generous remark about my ‘‘ability to
move skilfully between literatures.’’ It was, after all, my goal to write a book that would
arouse the interest of educationists, psychologists, and philosophers alike. I am grateful to
Maxwell for the careful scrutiny that he has applied to the main tenets of my book. I am
equally grateful to the Review Editor of the present journal for offering me the opportunity
of responding, in the same issue, to some of Maxwell’s criticisms. There is no need to take
up space at the start by summarizing the book’s fundamental theses; Maxwell has done an
excellent job of that in the opening section of his review. Rather, I confine my task to that
of clarifying and defending my position on a number of specific issues where Maxwell has
found the book’s treatment wanting; and I explore those issues in more or less the same
order as they appear in his review.
(a) The primacy-of-justice thesis. In my book, I reject the thesis of the primacy of justice
as a moral ideal/principle or—if couched in virtue-based terms—as the overriding moral
virtue. The significant moral import of justice notwithstanding, it can sometimes be
eclipsed by other moral considerations. On this issue, Maxwell takes me to be endorsing
ethical pluralism a` la Thomas Hill. Furthermore, although he finds persuasive my obser-
vation that ‘‘normal people’’ are justice pluralists, he is skeptical of my reference to an
alleged recent philosophical consensus on the rejection of the primacy-of-justice thesis; at
least he does not consider such consensus to provide grounds for pluralism. Some of the
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philosophers who reject the primacy thesis and do not see justice as a common moral
denominator could, for instance, still be monists of another kind.
I have not read Hill’s work on pluralism, but judging from Maxwell’s description, I am
not sure that I would subscribe to it. I do have a soft spot for John Stuart Mill’s qualified
pluralism according to which there exists a plurality of ‘‘essential goods’’, including
justice, goods that are nonetheless all conducive to (but not reducible to) the sole intrinsic
value: higher-quality pleasure, which can then be used to adjudicate between them (JDBE,
pp. 146–148). I suppose that makes me more of a Millian than a Hillian. Be that as it may,
my arguments against the primacy-of-justice thesis follow two different lines and are
meant to appeal to different audiences. On the one hand, I enlist the views of a number of
contemporary justice pluralists not as an argumentum verecundiam with respect to an
emerging consensus, but rather in order to show that unless one is a Kantian or a Platonist,
one has no good reason to believe in the primacy of justice as a moral ideal. It is
particularly incoherent of virtue ethicists such as Foot, or postmodernists such as Lyotard,
to hold like grim death to this belief. On the other hand, I appeal to the intuitions of
ordinary people in order to persuade moral psychologists such as Damon, Hoffman, and
Blasi, who all endorse the primacy-of-justice thesis in one form or another, that if they
really want to record ‘‘unencumbered’’ public opinion, they had better revise their thesis.
(b) The single-basis theory of desert. I argue, contrary to what seems to be the prevailing
opinion among philosophers, that desert has a single basis, moral virtue, rather than many
and disparate bases. Maxwell strongly disagrees, so much so that he considers my view of
a unitary, ‘‘cosmic’’ desert little more than a regression to Kohlberg’s simplistic ‘‘good
boy/good girl’’ third stage of moral development. The problem with the single-basis
theory, in Maxwell’s view, is that it violates a minimal coherence condition of any desert
claim: the condition that the claim must be based on a situational fact with prima facie
relevance. For example, the fact that Michael Schumacher was allegedly uncaring towards
to his granny has no prima facie situational relevance to his deserving, or not deserving, his
Formula 1 titles. Moreover, a person who puts career achievement before all other personal
ideals may deserve to be lonely at the twilight of life, but not to get pancreatic cancer; and
so forth. Notably, Maxwell does not doubt that ordinary people frequently pass judgments
of cosmic desert. For example, he would not question the fact that many people took a dim
view of Schumacher the racing driver after they read about Schumacher the grandson. He
simply points out that ordinary people are not always reasonable in their judgments. After
all, ‘‘sham judgments’’ of desert abound in ordinary language, as I point out in my book,
and here we have a case in point. Generally speaking, conceptual analysis, although taking
everyday intuitions as its starting point, may have to correct and amend those intuitions if
they turn out to be unreasonable and internally inconsistent. The important question is not
whether people do endorse the single-basis view of desert but whether they should endorse
it.
While I agree with Maxwell’s assumption about the corrigibility of everyday intuitions,
I am not persuaded by his argument against the single-basis thesis. Curiously, he does not
take account of my detailed attempt to ward off concerns similar to his own (JDBE,
pp. 71–73). What kind of connection must there obtain between the situation and the
object of desert for the above-mentioned relevance condition to be satisfied? Obviously, a
causal connection is not sufficient: there was a strong causal connection between Hannibal
Lecter’s hard work in luring in his human victims and eating them; yet his pleasure in
eating them was not a deserved outcome. More plausibly, we might suppose that a
conceptual connection needs to obtain. Indeed, that is clearly admitted in my book. More
precisely, I admit that there are a number of human spheres of interaction, having to do
74 K. Kristja´nsson
123
with rewards, punishments, gratitude, or resentment, where desert-outcomes are, in prin-
ciple, non-substitutable. In plain language this means, for example, that if P commits a
burglary, then P deserves, not punishment tout court, but punishment for that crime;
similarly, if P apprehends a wanted criminal, P deserves a reward for that capture; not any
old stroke of luck befalling P will do. We could say that these are cases where a strong
relevance condition needs to be satisfied. Yet I argue, first, that these are exceptional cases
of desert rather than paradigmatic ones and, second, that even when such a strong rele-
vance condition obtains, we are still willing to accept, as a second-best option, cases where
P gets reward/punishment unrelated to the immediately ‘‘relevant’’ situation: If P does not
receive the deserved reward for apprehending the criminal, we will take some heart in
knowing that P later has had an unrelated stroke of luck. Maxwell goes further than I do
and insists that a (conceptual) relevance condition needs to apply across the whole spec-
trum of desert judgments. I would be ready to acknowledge that a weak relevance
condition must obtain—if not, anyone could be said to deserve anything whatever, on a
whim. However, things are always conceptually connected under some description.
Schumacher’s alleged aloofness towards his grandmother is not conceptually connected to
his Formula 1 successes under the description ‘‘acts relevant to winning a Formula 1 title,’’
but they are so under the description ‘‘acts relevant to the general assessment of a human
being and what that person deserves in life.’’ The disagreement between me and Maxwell
is not about whether or not a prima facie relevance condition needs to apply; it is about the
scope of the description under which desert-relevance obtains. I believe—and try to argue
in my book—that the ‘‘cosmic’’ beliefs entertained by many lay people are more appro-
priate in this regard than the beliefs of the philosophical majority.
(c) Justice-based or only desert-based emotions? Maxwell finds the analysis of the
numerous desert-based emotions in my Chap. 3 intriguing, but he wonders why I do not
explore the whole gamut of justice-based emotions, including those having to do with the
upholding or violation of entitlements rather than deserts. He even suggests that I may have
become caught on the horns of a dilemma: Either I analyze only a sub-class of actual
justice-based emotions, in which case my account of emotions comprising people’s sense
of justice is ‘‘woefully incomplete,’’ or I consider the desert-based emotions to exhaust the
number of justice-based emotions, in which case I have backed down from the view
presented in my Chap. 2 that both deserts and entitlements are relevant to justice as well as
to a sense of justice.
There is a relatively painless explanation at hand: I have not abandoned the plurality-of-
justice view. The reason why I chose to consider desert-based emotions only was threefold
(two of the relevant issues are mentioned briefly in JDBE, p. 87). First, desert-based
emotions are, in the view of most psychologists, developmentally prior to entitlement-
based emotions. Given where my subsequent discussion heads (in Chap. 4), the former
kind of emotions are also prior there in the order of argumentive salience. Second, desert is
logically prior to justice, in a justificatory sense: Desert claims can sometimes be used to
criticize as internally unjust the rules that underlie entitlements, whereas those rules cannot
be used to criticize desert claims in the same way—that is, qua desert claims—although
they can be used to criticize them qua justice claims. Third, there is the practical matter of
space and division of labor: I have discussed a number of entitlement-based emotions (such
as anger and angry envy) in some detail elsewhere, and did not think that those accounts
would bear repeating in the book under discussion.
(d) The just-world hypothesis. Many people seem to believe that the world is essentially
a just place, and that persons typically deserve their fate in life. Maxwell rightly under-
scores the apparent unreasonableness of this view: namely, the availability of
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overwhelming disconfirming evidence. ‘‘All you have to do is turn on the 6 o’clock news.’’
I admit in my book that just-world believers seem to be strangely illogical and immoral
people. However, I blame just-world researchers for failing to explain (or even trying to
explain) the origin and the precise nature of this view. My working hypothesis is that
people simply cannot be that stupid. Therefore, I suggest a possible charitable interpre-
tation of what people mean or might mean in ‘‘subscribing’’ to this view: arguably, strong
just-world believers doubt more than others—and often reasonably so—that the victims of
hardship have exercised their moral virtues to the full. This interpretation implies that
strong just-world believers might show special sympathy for demonstrably blameless
victims, and I allude to one supportive empirical study to that effect. Maxwell has no
patience with my charity work. He thinks that just-world believers’ ‘‘sympathy for
blameless victims’’ involves a contradiction, for their general view is that everyone
deserves what he gets. Why bother to rescue a ‘‘patiently false’’ folk belief?
I would draw attention to one simple observation in response to Maxwell’s objection.
The typical instrument for recording belief or non-belief in the ‘‘just-world hypothesis’’
requires respondents to express agreement or disagreement with various statements,
including ‘‘I’ve found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has’’; ‘‘People who
get ‘lucky breaks’ have usually earned their good fortune’’; ‘‘Students almost always
deserve the grades they get in school’’; ‘‘By and large, people deserve what they get’’;
‘‘People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves’’; and so forth
(my italics). Notice the italicized words. There is no opportunity for respondents to express
the view that people always deserve what they get. There are built-in qualifications in all
the statements. My charitable hypothesis is that most strong just-world believers answer as
they do, not in spite of, but rather because of, those qualifications, and that they would
gladly acknowledge that people sometimes are innocent victims of circumstance (although
much less often than others tend to think).
(e) Martin Hoffman’s theory. I criticize Martin Hoffman’s theory of emphatic/sympa-
thetic development for not trusting emotions alone to do the work of bridging the notorious
‘‘gap’’ between moral cognition and moral action, and for relying instead upon justice as a
pure, rational moral requirement. Maxwell thinks that my criticism betrays a ‘‘fundamental
misunderstanding’’ of the justice/caring dichotomy as it is played out in contemporary
developmental moral psychology. He cites as an example Blasi’s 1999 article (referenced
in Maxwell). There Blasi concedes that emotions do tend to elicit, direct, and sustain
behavior. Blasi refuses to acknowledge, however, that they can power a specifically moral
engine. The reason for that is that emotions—which Blasi understands as psychological
processes connected to bodily events—arise spontaneously and unintentionally and
produce an automatic readiness to act or refrain from acting. A moral action must be one
for which an agent can be held responsible, and in accordance with everyday intuitions this
means it must be intentional and conscious, and must incorporate moral reasons. That fact
is nothing less than the objective foundation on which morality stands. By contrast,
emotions produce actions unintentionally (always) and unconsciously (often); and they
presuppose (at best), rather than incorporating, moral reasons. Those observations then
pave the way for Blasi’s rationalist moral-self solution to the gap-problem.
All this is true of Blasi and many of his fellow psychologists who uphold a
non-cognitive natural-kind theory of emotion. But Hoffman is not one of them. He takes
sympathy to be a moral emotion in a sense that Blasi would reject. In fact, Blasi’s paper is
directed precisely at people like Hoffman who believe that moral emotions can help bridge
the cognition–action gap. My criticism of Hoffman is not that he is a post-Kohlbergian
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rationalist on a par with Blasi, but rather that he has not fully extricated himself from the
trap set by the Kantian/Kohlbergian way of thinking about justice.
(f) Moral education versus political/civic education. Maxwell admirably summarizes
my view on the relationship between moral and political education. I regard political
education as built upon basic moral education in (early) childhood; I believe justice needs
to begin at home—in emotional sensitization to everyday situations involving justice and
injustice—and must carry on from there, at a later stage, into the political realm. Imple-
menting a program of civic education instead of, before, or alongside a moral-education
program is putting the cart before or beside the horse (or, at worst, having a cart and no
horse). Maxwell notices a potential difficulty in this view, however: How can a moral
educator set in place a program of proper emotional sensitization to justice without thereby
taking a stand on politically loaded questions about justice?
My answer to this question lies in Sect. 5.2 where I try to defend what I call
‘‘non-expansive’’ character education. The core element in that education, as I specify it, is
moral cosmopolitanism: the belief in cosmopolitan moral values that transcend the
boundaries of time, place, and political systems. Maxwell understands me correctly in
holding that pre-civic moral education can and should be concerned with claims that
transcend political controversies. Obviously such claims will have political content—that
is, content which is politically relevant—but if we believe in the basic tenets of
non-expansive character education, such content should appeal to all morally mature
persons, irrespective of their political or religious affiliations.
(g) Crossing the barbed wire. When we come, finally, to the methodological guiding
principle of my book—that philosophers and social scientists must engage each other in
debate and co-operation—Maxwell’s critique becomes uncharacteristically cryptic. He
considers me to be espousing a new kind of evidential naturalism based on Millian
precedents. I do not claim any originality for my approach, and I am not sure that I am
venturing much further than the theorists that Maxwell cites as earlier neo-Aristotelian,
normative, or evidential naturalists. Be that as it may, Maxwell thinks, on the one hand,
that my approach constitutes a potentially harmonious bedfellow to post-Kohlbergian
moral psychology while, on the other hand, he reminds us of the fact that moral
psychologists are wary of too close an encounter with philosophers. That is not because of
the notorious tendency of philosophers to deny the fact-value distinction, but because an
affinity with (particular) philosophers may make psychologists vulnerable to ‘‘guilt by
association’’ (something like: ‘‘Your favored philosopher is guilty of error; therefore, your
empirical studies are faulty, too’’). It is not clear from the context if Maxwell wants to
embrace or resists those concerns. My point here would simply be that moral psychologists
are in fact, whether they like it or not, dependent upon particular philosophers and
philosophies. Incidentally, although Blasi chastises philosophers for their damaging
influence on moral psychology, he has no compunctions about enlisting the aid of a
particular philosopher, Harry Frankfurt, in constructing his moral-self thesis. Psycholo-
gists’ self-denying ordinances with respect to the use of philosophical material hardly ever
survive to the end. Even when they appear to do so, philosophical assumptions tend to get
smuggled in somewhere below the waterline of overtness.
In the case of Damon’s stage theory of justice internalization, I propose that such
assumptions be made explicit in the research design and interpretation of data, so that we
can discover whether children’s developing views about the allocation of resources are
really about justice (and then what kind of justice) or not. Maxwell suggests, perhaps
rhetorically, that Damon’s theory is, for all its unquestionable indeterminacy when viewed
from theoretical heights, ‘‘simple, accessible and serviceable.’’ Maybe it is not really a
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theory of justice internalization, but rather a theory of allocation-rule internalization, but
why should it be any less interesting for that? That is a big question, upon which I have no
space to expand here except by indicating briefly the direction my full-blown answer
would take.
We live in a world which, when seen from a certain natural point of view, is moral all
the way down. Moral concepts do not so much evaluate the world of description as
describe the world of evaluation. From the moral point of view—which in many instances
is the proper point of view—non-moral facts about the world may be completely irrelevant.
It is a descriptive and non-moral fact about the world that people do not have wings and
cannot fly to the sun. This does not mean that we are unfree to fly to the sun; we are simply
unable to do so. Indeed, with respect to questions of social freedom or unfreedom, the fact
that our choices to do x are restricted is, as such, irrelevant; what is relevant is whether or
not there is another agent who is morally responsible for the imposition or non-removal of
obstacles to our choices. If there is, we are unfree as well as unable to do x. Similarly, the
mere fact that resources are allocated in a certain way, and that some people at certain
developmental stages would want them to be allocated in that way or in another, is
essentially uninteresting from the moral point of view, let alone from the ‘‘justice point of
view.’’ It is not until we start to ponder how resources should be allocated from a moral
point of view (as opposed, for instance, to an egoistic, prudential, or aesthetic point of
view) that resource allocation becomes an object of moral interest. So Maxwell’s, perhaps
rhetorical, suggestion is partly right and partly wrong. It is right that children’s views about
resource allocation could be relevant from a certain psychological point of view. It is
wrong, however, that they are relevant from the point of view of moral psychology unless
they constitute children’s moral opinions. More specifically, if we intend to trace not only
children’s moral opinions about resource allocation, but their opinions about that aspect of
morality called justice, then the research design had better take this intention into account
from the word go. This is why moral psychologists and moral philosophers need to cross
the barbed wire between them or, better still, tear it down completely.
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